Peter John Olivi’s relationship to Bonaventure is intriguing.1 Outwardly, they both appear as the leading figures of two different trends of Franciscan politics: Olivi usually being qualified as a “radical” inspiring the dissidence of the Spirituals, while Bonaventure would represent a central and balanced attitude regarding Franciscan poverty. Likewise, as far as their apocalyptical expectations are concerned, Olivi is certainly an overt and avowed Joachite, whereas Bonaventure supposedly makes a more detached use of Joachim of Fiore’s works. Recent studies of (...) Olivi’s philosophical approaches present him as anticipating themes soon to be developed by Duns Scotus rather than associate him with the Bonaventurian... (shrink)

Dans des écrits datant des années 1277-79, le théologien franciscain Pierre de Jean Olivi emploie à cinq reprise le mot averroista, pour critiquer, non pas tant la doctrine de l'unicité de l'intellect possible que ses implications anthropologiques ou angélologiques. Cette critique bien informée, convergente avec d'autres attaques franciscaines, notamment les dénonciations de Roger Bacon, démontre la réalité et l'ampleur d'une entreprise philosophique menée par des maîtres ès arts, s'inspirant d'Averroès, dans les années 1260-70 ; elle indique aussi la diversité de (...) leurs points de vue. Dès son apparition, il n'y a donc pas un, mais plusieurs 'averroïsmes' latin. (shrink)

Autour de 1100, pour les jeunes femmes de l’aristocratie éduquées dans des monastères, l’écriture de lettres d’amour fictives à leur maître de rhétorique constituait un apprentissage aussi bien littéraire qu’émotionnel. Comme le rappelle Barbara Newman, les Epistolae duorum amantium, correspondance échangée par Héloïse et Pierre Abélard durant leur liaison, doivent se comprendre dans cette lumière. Leur singularité tient largement au fait qu’Héloïse a choisi de donner corps à une figure poétique, en s’identifiant aux héroïnes tragiques d’Ovide.

Gerald Odonis' treatise on contracts, restitutions, and excommunication is one of his earliest works, composed in Toulouse ca. 1315-17. Mainly based on Peter John Olivi's De contractibus, but using a variety of other sources and offering some original arguments as well, it is remarkable for its pragmatic approach to economic phenomena. His rejection of the rational argument against usury reveals a casual use of the bull Exiit qui seminat, defining Franciscan poverty, as well as a change of assumptions in the (...) approach to economic exchange. Whereas various explanations can be provided for the provocative aspect of this youthful treatise, all in all, it can best be described as a free and uninhibited interpretation of the scholastic tradition. (shrink)

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three (...) mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment. (shrink)

Héloïse est sans aucun doute l’une des figures féminines les plus illustres du Moyen Âge. Elle propose l’exemple même d’un mythe tellement universel qu’il masque la vraie femme. Associée à Abélard, Héloïse offre l’image de l’amour le plus profond, le plus éternel qui unit les amants au-delà même de la mort. La légende s’est emparée de la femme qui reste encore aujourd’hui une inconnue. Deux ouvrages essentiels viennent heureusement combler cette lacune. Le premier est la traduction et la prés...

What are the processes, from conception to adulthood, that enable a single cell to grow into a sentient adult? Neuroconstructivism is a pioneering 2 volume work that sets out a whole new framework for considering the complex topic of development, integrating data from cognitive studies, computational work, and neuroimaging.

La lecture néokantienne de Platon est souvent reléguée au rang de simple curiosité historique dont l’intérêt ne dépasserait pas le cercle étroit des spécialistes de ce courant. C’est particulièrement regrettable, car elle offre un exemple remarquable de réappropriation philosophique philologiquement informée d’un penseur majeur du passé. Si l’histoire de la philosophie doit avoir, par-delà son intérêt antiquaire tout à fait légitime, une véritable pertinence pour la philosophie en train de se...

In the fourth section of Goethe’s Zahme Xenien we find the quatrain from which I have taken the theme of such an old and new controversy, which, as I hope, concerns both Germanic studies and the other humanities: “What was it that kept you from us so apart?” I always read Plutarch again and again. “And what was the lesson he did impart?” “They were all human beings—so much is plain.”1 In the very years when Goethe wrote these lines, that (...) is in the 1820s, Hegel repeatedly gave his lectures on the philosophy of history. Right at the beginning he formulated the opposite view which I should like briefly to characterize as “cultural relativism.”Every age has such peculiar circumstances, such individual conditions that it must be interpreted, and can only be interpreted, by reference to itself…. Nothing is shallower in this respect than the frequent appeal to Greek and Roman example which so often occurred among the French at the time of their Revolution. Nothing could be more different than the nature of these peoples and the nature of our own times.2 What is at issue here is not, of course, Hegel’s assertion that ages and peoples differ from each other. We all know that, and Goethe, the attentive reader and traveler, also knew, for instance, that the Roman carnival differed in its character from the celebrations of the Feast of Saint Rochus at Bingen, both of which he had described so lovingly. What makes the cultural historian into a cultural relativist is only the conclusion which we saw Hegel draw, that cultures and styles of life are not only different but wholly incommensurable, in other words that it is absurd to compare the peoples of a region or an age with human beings of other zones because there is no common denominator that would justify us in doing so. 1. ‘Was hat dich nun von uns entfernt?’ Hab immer den Plutarch gelesen. ‘Was has du den dabei gelernt?’ Sind eben alles Menschen gewesen.’ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sämtlich Werke. Jubiläums-ausgabe in 40 Bänden 4:73; with commentary.2. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorselungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, 20 vols. , 12:17. E. H. Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute and Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition at the University of London from 1959 to 1976. His many influential works include The Story of Art, Art and Illusion, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, The Sense of Order, Ideals and Idols, The Image and the Eye, Tributes, Aby Warburg, and New Light on Old Masters. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “The Museum: Past, Present and Future” , “Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye” , and “Representation and Misrepresentation”. (shrink)

It is a thankless task to have to reply to Professor Murray Krieger’s “Retrospective.” Qui s’excuse, s’accuse, and since I cannot ask my readers to embark on their own retrospective of my writings and test them for consistency, I have little chance of restoring my reputation in their eyes. Hence I would have been happier to leave Professor Krieger to his agonizing, if he did not present himself the “spokesman” for a significant body of theorists who appear to have acclaimed (...) my book on Art and Illusion without ever having read it. The followers of this school of criticism—of which Professor Krieger is a prominent member—had apparently convinced themselves that the book lent support to an aesthetics in which the notions of reality and of nature had no place. They thought that I had subverted the old idea of mimesis and that all that remained were different systems of conventional signs which were made to stand for an unknowable reality. True, professor Krieger admits that I never endorsed such an interpretation of my views, and he even concedes that there are passages in Art and Illusion which contradict such an out-and-out relativism, but he wants to convince his readers that these contradictions lead precisely to the ambiguities he now proposes to analyse.If he were right that the book encourages such a misreading, all I could do would be to express my regrets for having failed to make myself sufficiently clear. Luckily I can draw comfort from the fact that unlike these literary critics, the leading archaeologist of this country, Professor Stuart Piggott, had no difficulty at all in discerning my meaning and profiting from my arguments. In his Walter Neurath Memorial Lecture of 1978, entitled Antiquity Depicted: Aspects of Archaeological Illustration, the author did me the honour of taking a statement from my book as his starting point. It is the passage at the end of part I in which I recapitulate the content of the first two chapters:What matters to us is that the correct portrait, like the useful map, is an end product on a long road through schema and correction. It is not a faithful record of a visual experience but the faithful construction of a relational mode.Neither the subjectivity of vision nor the sway of conventions need lead us to deny that such a model can be constructed to any required degree of accuracy. What is decisive here is clearly the word “required.” The form of a representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the requirements of the society in which the given visual language gains currency.1 1. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1956 , p. 90. E. H. Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute and Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition at the University of London from 1959 to 1976. His many influential works include The Story of Art, Art and Illusion, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, The Sense of Order, Ideals and Idols, The Image and the Eye, and, most recently, Tributes. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “The Museum: Past, Present and Future and “Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye”. (shrink)

E. H. Gombrich’s bestselling history of the world for young readers tells the story of mankind from the Stone Age to the atomic bomb, focusing not on small detail but on the sweep of human experience, the extent of human achievement, and the depth of its frailty. The product of a generous and humane sensibility, this timeless account makes intelligible the full span of human history. In forty concise chapters, Gombrich tells the story of man from the stone age to (...) the atomic bomb. In between emerges a colorful picture of wars and conquests, grand works of art, and the spread and limitations of science. This is a text dominated not by dates and facts, but by the sweep of mankind’s experience across the centuries, a guide to humanity’s achievements and an acute witness to its frailties. (shrink)

To the historian of art, it is evident that the two authors’ notion of ‘art’ is of very recent date, and not shared by everybody. They claim: ‘The purpose of art, surely, is not merely to depict or represent reality -- for that can be accomplished very easily with a camera -- but to enhance, transcend, or even to distort reality’ . They do not explain how one could photograph Paradise or Hell, the Creation of the World, the Passion of (...) Christ, or the escapades of the ancient gods -- all subjects that can be found represented in our museums. Nor is it more legitimate to generalize from certain Indian conventions of representing the female nude than it is for the academic tradition to take the Venus de Medici for the same purpose. Even a fleeting visit to one of the great museums might serve to convince the authors that few of the exhibits conform to the laws of art they postulate. [followed by response from V.S. Ramachandran]. (shrink)

An accessible selection of Professor Gombrich's best and most characteristic writing.

Professor Gombrich's last book and first narrative work in over 20 years.

Que dire des épreuves de la vie? Nous ne savons quelles elles sont qu'à les traverser et ignorons ce qu'elles sont en les endurant. Quand surviennent-elles? Comment? Et pourquoi? Aveugles lorsqu'elles frappent, hagards lorsqu'elles cessent, comment pourrions-nous porter sur elles nos regards? Dans l'obscure nuit qu'elles répandent sur nos vies, tout n'est cependant pas que ténèbres. Car les épreuves révèlent, elles phénoménalisent. Sous leur sombre lumière, tout se montre sous son vrai jour. Condamnés par le pire à donner le meilleur, (...) nous qui les essuyons faisons alors nos preuves. Dans l'épreuve, l'ego apparaît donc comme jamais il ne le fait, non pas comme il le doit, mais toujours comme il est. Faudrait-il ajouter que d'épreuves comme de phénoménologie, il n'en est que de la vie pour que l'idée d'une phénoménologie des épreuves de la vie s'impose en philosophie? Inutile : l'irrésistible réalité de ces épreuves impose à qui les subit un inextinguible besoin de philosophie. Or qui mieux que la phénoménologie peut, en philosophie, mettre à l'épreuve les épreuves de la vie. (shrink)

“April is the cruelest month, breeding Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing memory and desire… ” So, begins T.S. Eliot’s iconic poem, “The Wasteland,” challenging the memory of Chaucer’s April from Canterbury Tales, as being a delightful month to go on pilgrimage. Platonic teachings emphasize that you don’t create, you just remember. Might the inverse might also be true, “You don’t remember, you just create.” As the oneirocritic, Robert Bosnak, contends, you do not actually remember your dreams. You remember (...) your memory you recreate the dream in this time. Since the challenges of post-modernism, this is no longer a far-fetched idea. The eminent historian of immigration, Deborah Dash Moore, defines history in this regard, as “a search for a plausible narrative.” “History” is not a record of what happened, but rather, is a record of what we believe happened, or what we want to believe happened. This brings to the fore Foucault’s documenting the relationship of knowledge to power, as well as Freud’s assertion that material which is unacceptable to the ego, is disguised, in order to make them palatable. This places the notion of memory in a different light. There are incidents that occurred fifty years ago that seem as if they occurred five minutes ago. The depth psychologist and champion of the imagination, James Hillman, referred to this process as “soul-making.” Back to T.S. Eliot: when he studied Sanskrit at Harvard, he was certainly aware that the Sanskrit word for memory, smara (from which smrti “that which is remembered,” is derived) is also an epithet for Kama Deva, the Indian Cupid. Hence, the mixing of memory and desire. Perhaps, in this light, the study of history, which is a form of collective memory, is also a form of mass therapy, an effort to process the collective past. Hegel and Marx both believed classical India to be an inferior civilization because it had “no history,” but collections of mythologies. Maybe classical India, however, held an awareness that all memory is myth, a word which in its early Greek form literally translates as “plot.” Jesus declares (in the Gospel story) “Let the dead bury the dead.” As the Jesus narrative exemplifies, however, burying the dead is no easy task. Perhaps our ongoing, ever-morphing narratives, allow us an oblique opportunity to connect with and process our pain. And in this theatre of memory, the goal may not be to accumulate or catalogue what has been spoken (itihasa), but look a good miller, to process the grain into its essence: from what has passed, and is passing, and is to come, into what always is. Perhaps, the pilgrimage of the mind, on its endless perigination of story, is meant to ultimately take us to love, but that may be unspeakable. Keywords: memory, desire, narrative, history, myth, power. (shrink)

Le lien entre la philosophie de la nature et la destinée morale chez Bergson, c'est une sorte de médiation anthropologique ou sociologique, mais aussi une médiation spécifiquement philosophique, qui propose une certaine compréhension du lien entre «nature» et «esprit». Selon l'auteur, ce lien peut s'effectuer grâce à une mise en lumière de la fonction de la durée dans l'intelligence humaine et dans son rapport à la norme morale.

Court-ordered caesarean sections against the explicit wishes of the pregnant woman have been criticised as violations of the woman's fundamental right to autonomy and to the inviolability of the person--particularly, so it is argued, because the fetus in utero is not yet a person. This paper examines the logic of this position and argues that once the fetus has passed a certain stage of neurological development it is a person, and that then the whole issue becomes one of balancing of (...) rights: the right-to-life of the fetal person against the right to autonomy and inviolability of the woman; and that the fetal right usually wins. (shrink)

There can be few other uses in the Latin language which afford us so great an insight into the mental attitude of a writer at the moment of his writing, or which endow writing with so much of that personal colour which the voice alone gives in perfection, as does the singular use of the pronoun nos. All forms of this word which occur in the speeches of individuals, who are at the moment speaking independently, are either wholly singular uses, (...) or partly plural uses with more or less justification for the plural form according to the extent to which the speaker is identifying himself with his surroundings. Thus we find all degrees of plurality in such forms, and it is those instances in which the plural form can be least definitely justified which we call ‘singular’ or ‘unreal plural’ uses, and which prove to be the most fascinating from a psychological point of view. The object of the present essay is to inquire how far the varieties of meaning in the singular use of nos, which Professor R. S. Conway has pointed out in Cicero, appear also in Vergil. (shrink)

Expounds on the ethical hazards of advertising cosmetic surgery. Impact of physician entrepreneurialism on the fiduciary concept of physician-patient relationship; Expectation on physician's non-abuse of superior position; Physician's responsibility to inform patient to enhance the latter's control over personal life and health care; Exacerbation of patient's vulnerability through misleading advertising.

Originally published 1867. This volume describes not only the basic tenets of the Sufis but also the _Ahl i wahdat_ which was a branch of Sufism. The author’s use of a Persian manuscript treatise by ‘Aziz bin Mohammed Nafasi’ is an indispensable tool, particularly because the author did not merely translate it but gave a clearer and more succinct account of the system. The volume contains an Appendix containing a glossary of allegorical and technical terms in use among Sufiistic writers.

The Analytic/Synthetic distinction did not originate in Kant, but in Port-Royal's logical theory. The key for the doctrine is the explicite recognition of two different kinds of relative clauses, e.g. explicative and determinative. In the middle eighteenth century the distinction becomes a topic within the grammars. Although we can find by grammarians different criteria for the distinction, these criteria (for which we can find medieval sources) are for the main predictable from the original theory of ideas, which was presented in (...) Port-Royal's logical writings. The topic of the two relative clauses (somewhat broader than the analytic/synthetic distinction) can be used to give empirical criteria for analyticity and also for revisiting Quine's criticism of the topic. Analyticity yet appears as a master piece of classical linguistic philosophy and not as being the empty dogma of modern empiricism. (shrink)

What are the processes, from conception to adulthood, that enable a single cell to grow into a sentient adult? The processes that occur along the way are so complex that any attempt to understand development necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach, integrating data from cognitive studies, computational work, and neuroimaging - an approach till now seldom taken in the study of child development. Neuroconstructivism is a major new 2 volume publication that seeks to redress this balance, presenting an integrative new framework for (...) considering development. In the first volume, the authors review up-to-to date findings from neurobiology, brain imaging, child development, computer and robotic modelling to consider why children's thinking develops the way it does. They propose a new synthesis of development that is based on 5 key principles found to operate at many levels of descriptions. They use these principles to explain what causes a number of key developmental phenomena, including infants' interacting with objects, early social cognitive interactions, and the causes of dyslexia. The "neuroconstructivist" framework also shows how developmental disorders do not arise from selective damage to the normal cognitive system, but instead arise from developmental processes that operate under atypical constraints. How these principles work is illustrated in several case studies ranging from perceptual to social and reading development. Finally, the authors use neuroimaging, behavioural analyses, computational simulations and robotic models to provide a way of understanding the mechanisms and processes that cause development to occur. (shrink)

In this response, we consider four main issues arising from the commentaries to the target article. These include further details of the theory of interactive specialization, the relationship between neuroconstructivism and selectionism, the implications of neuroconstructivism for the notion of representation, and the role of genetics in theories of development. We conclude by stressing the importance of multidisciplinary approaches in the future study of cognitive development and by identifying the directions in which neuroconstructivism can expand in the Twenty-first Century.

IGM form a unified group and we denote their consensus by the sign Z; in the absence of I we signify the consensus of GM with £. It will be seen that in the earlier part of Book I this family is reduced to M. Here one may sometimes call on the help of Harleianus 2564 saec. xv, which we call h; this manuscript, though overlaid with the vulgate text, shows a number of striking readings which reveal a source closely (...) related to G. At the end of the poem we lack the guidance of A, which, though not free from interpolations, is by far the most sincere witness; here the testimony of Cantabrigiensis Pembrokianus 280 saec. xii, which we call F and which in the earlier books shows more fidelity to the A-tradition than any other manuscript, is sometimes useful, though it cannot be relied on without grave reservations. Editors usually quote Monacensis 8122 as if it were a primary witness; it is nothing of the sort, but rather a much corrupted and interpolated offshoot of the A-tradition diluted by some contamination from Z. We use ω to indicate the mass of the vulgar manuscripts and ς to indicate some of them. (shrink)

Plato’s treatment of the theme of insatiability of desire in the Philebus is only implicit, but deeply original. Considering pleasure as the immediate object of desire, and caracterising pleasure as an apeiron (i.e. an undetermined or an illimited), it locates the origin of that phenomenon not in the essence of desire itself, but in its object, which by nature always eludes it. The only way of avoiding it is therefore to reorientate desire towards another object, namely the intelligible, which is (...) the only thing able to limitate it – which does not mean to reduce it, but rather to give it the means of finding its own satisfaction in itself. The desire thus transformed is philosophy itself, the only way towards goodness and happiness according to Plato. (shrink)

People have always been xenophobic, but an explicit philosophical and scientific view of human racial difference only began to emerge during the modern period. Why and how did this happen? Surveying a range of philosophical and natural-scientific texts, dating from the Spanish Renaissance to the German Enlightenment, Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference charts the evolution of the modern concept of race and shows that natural philosophy, particularly efforts to taxonomize and to order nature, played a crucial role. Smith demonstrates (...) how the denial of moral equality between Europeans and non-Europeans resulted from converging philosophical and scientific developments, including a declining belief in human nature's universality and the rise of biological classification. The racial typing of human beings grew from the need to understand humanity within an all-encompassing system of nature, alongside plants, minerals, primates, and other animals. While racial difference as seen through science did not arise in order to justify the enslavement of people, it became a rationalization and buttress for the practices of trans-Atlantic slavery. From the work of François Bernier to G. W. Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, and others, Smith delves into philosophy's part in the legacy and damages of modern racism. With a broad narrative stretching over two centuries, Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference takes a critical historical look at how the racial categories that we divide ourselves into came into being. (shrink)

La connaissance est traditionnellement envisagée comme un processus mettant en rapport un sujet et un objet. Le processus peut être doublement orienté selon que l'on considère la réception de l'information par l e sujet, ou la représentation de l'objet qui peut avoir différentes modalités, parmi lesquelles je compte l'assertion de quelque chose quant à l'objet. Je schématise ces deux orientations de la façon suivante: I = K1 R = K2Prendre connaissance d'un manuel de mathématiques, être ébloui par une lumière vive, (...) n'est pas identique à résoudre un problème de mathématiques, ou à savoir que la voiture qui vient en face n'a pas mis ses feux de croisement. Il y a bien lieu de distinguer deux types de connaissances: K1 et K2; je ne me préoccuperai pas de la question générale de l'identité des éléments de chacune et j'utiliserai les mêmes symboles S et O. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est le tout premier à proposer un tour d'horizon historique et systématique des multiples conceptions phénoménologiques du mouvement. Après une introduction qui s'efforce de retracer la 'Begriffs- und Wirkungsgeschichte' de cette notion de mouvement, et par là de montrer comment elle fut longtemps l'apanage de la philosophie de la nature avant que la phénoménologie ne s'en empare et lui rétrocède toute sa dimension subjective et charnelle, les auteurs livrent une série d'analyses détaillées qui se répartissent en deux grandes (...) parties. Dans la première, il s'agit d'examiner critiquement le traitement que des penseurs-clés lui ont réservé. Sont ainsi étudiés le sens et la portée des notions de kinesthèse, de géostatisme et d'a priori matériel chez Husserl, mais également le concept de mobilité chez Heidegger, la dynamique de l'existence chez Patocka ou encore l'interprétation merleau-pontienne du cas Schneider. Dans la seconde partie, il est davantage question d'explorer de nouvelles voies, d'articuler des usages neufs et de développer des interprétations inédites du mouvement à partir de la méthode et de la conceptualité phénoménologiques, en dialogue avec les sciences cognitives, la religion et les arts - en l'occurrence la danse. L'ensemble pose ainsi les jalons pour une approche phénoménologique renouvelée du mouvement vécu. (shrink)

The concept of “natural attitude” as it was developed by Husserl in the Ideas I plays a key role in the phenomenological methodology. But was it in and for itself enough investigated? Heidegger’s critics and radical transformation of it is well known, unlike its treatment by the first generation of Husserl’s student. Adolf Reinach, for a short time leader of the realist phenomenology faithful to Husserl’s breakthroughs in the Logical Investigations, is one of the latter. Within a veiled debate with (...) Husserl about possibilities and limits of transcendental idealism (e. g. a critical reception of Ideas I) he attempts a kind of rehabilitation of natural attitude by way of an original and thorough description of it. Still in a strictly phenomenological manner, it though privileges for strategic reasons the “variation” process over the “reduction” one. The result is a subtle reflection that helps us thinking lived experience exactly as we lived it and not how philosophy would have it. (shrink)

L’ouvrage que présente Alexandra Michalewski reprend et articule trois questions classiques dans les études plotiniennes. La première est celle des origines et des sources de la doctrine des Formes intelligibles dans la pensée de Plotin. Si cette doctrine puise dans la pensée platonicienne ses éléments principaux, elle ne peut pourtant s’expliquer entièrement par elle. Cette dernière a connu, en effet, de multiples remaniements et adaptations, elle a suscité de multiples débats, de sorte qu’e...

Vie, conatus, vertu.--Philosophie et théologie chez Spinoza.--Spinoza et le langage.--Spinoza et la théorie des attributs de Dieu de Maïmonide.--Allégorie et prophétie.--Société et communion chez Spinoza.--État et nature chez Spinoza.--Spinoza et l'État des Hébreux.--Durée et histoire chez Spinoza.--L'idée de loi.--Le chapitre XVI du Traité théologico-politique.--Le péché et le pardon d'après Spinoza.--Le Spinoza de Martial Guéroult I.--Le Spinoza de Martial Guéroult.